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Abstract Consider the the problem of maximizing the relative social welfare of
truthful single-winner voting schemes with cardinal preferences compared to the
classical range voting scheme. The range voting scheme is a simple and straight-
forward mechanism which deterministically maximizes the social welfare. However,
the scheme that is known to be non-truthful and we studied the truthful mechanism
that maximize the ratio of its expected social welfare to the social welfare achieved
by the range voting scheme. We provide a scheme which achieve a ratio of Ω(m−2/3)
in this paper. It is proved that this bound is tight asymptotically and it is impossible
to find a better voting scheme.
Keywords mechanism design · voting · cardinal voting · social choice · social
welfare
1 Introduction
A single-winner voting scheme is a function that takes the preference profile of n
voters on m candidates as input and generates a single winner. Single-winner voting
schemes are widely used in real life from the election of the US president to the
decision of party date in a club. Traditionally scientists focus on the setting that the
preference of each voter is a total order on the candidates. The classical result by
Gibbard [1] and and Satterthwaite [2] shows that under such setting there doesn’t
exist any non-dictatorial and truthful schemewith at least 3 candidates possible to win
the election. Scientists are working on the problem of manipulation of such voting
schemes such as the recent papers [3] and [4].
In this paper we study the voting problem under cardinal preference setting.
That is, for each voter i ∈ N, its preference is a function ui : M → [b1,b2] where
N = {1, . . . ,n} is the voter set, M = {1, . . . ,m} is the candidate set and b1 < b2 are
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the lower and upper bounds of possible “scores” for the candidates. Hence the pref-
erence profile u can be defined as u = (u1, . . . ,un). Under such cardinal preference
setting, we are able to define the cardinal social welfare of choosing candidate j and
Wel( j,u) = ∑ni=1 ui( j).
A simple and straightforward mechanism is the range voting scheme RV . The
range voting scheme is the scheme that the winner of the election is the candidate
j with maximized Wel( j,u). That is, the range voting scheme always returns the
candidate with highest total score.
It is obvious that the range voting schememaximizes the social welfare. However,
the range voting is not truthful. It fails as the way that the general ordinal scheme fails.
When the top 2 candidates has a tie (or tiny difference), it is possible and motivated
for some voters to manipulate the result if they prefer the second top candidate to the
top candidate. Thus the range voting scheme is not truthful.
Therefore, it is natural to study how much social welfare we can get by a truthful
mechanism compared to the non-truthful range voting scheme.
Since the preference function ui is always well-defined and preserve the prefer-
ence ordering of the candidates under positive affine transformation, we may regard
x→ aui(x)+ b as another description of x→ ui(x) for any a > 0 and b. Therefore
we can apply an different positive affine transformation to each voter’s preference
function and we can make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Preference Assumption) The preference function ui of each voter
i ∈ N is a function from M to [0,1] such that there exists some j0 and j1 in M such
that ui( j0) = 0 and ui( j1) = 1.
With this assumption, for any i ∈ N and j ∈ M, ui( j) ≥ 0. Also, there exists
some voter i∗ ∈ N and candidate j∗ ∈M such that i’s preferences on j, ui∗( j
∗) > 0.
Therefore we have the social welfare Wel(RV(u),u) ≥Wel( j∗,u) > 0. Hence it is
possible and reasonable to define the relative social welfare or welfare ratio for any
mechanism J as
ratio(J) = inf
u
E[Wel(J(u),u)]
Wel(RV (u),u)
Here we show that this assumption is sufficient to make the ratio function well
defined. Furthermore, we will show that this assumption is necessary to make the
problem interesting enough to study, which we be further discussed in Section 4.
A less general version of this problem is raised in Filos-Ratsikas and Miltersen’s
recent paper [5], except they have one more unnecessary assumption requiring that
there can’t be any ties in each voter i’s preference function. In their paper they provide
a truthful mechanism with a welfare ratio of Ω(m−3/4). They also provide a nega-
tive result for ordinal mechanisms (mechanisms that depends only on the candidates’
ranking of each voter) stating that any ordinal truthful mechanism can only achieve a
welfare ratio of O(m−2/3).
In this paper, we improve the result in [5]. We will show a truthful mechanism
with welfare ratio Ω(m−2/3), much better than the result in [5]. The formal state-
ment and proof of this result will be in Section 3. This mechanism cannot be further
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improved asymptotically due to the upper bound proved in [5]. In additional, the re-
sult above require the assumption requiring all preference functions to have no tie.
Therefore my results are more general and universal than the results in [5].
2 Preliminaries and Notation
2.1 Voting Systems
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} denote the set of voters or agents. Let M = {1, . . . ,m} denote the
set of candidates or alternatives.
A preference is a function u : M → [0,1] such that u( j0) = 0 and u( j1) = 1 for
some j0 and ji in M. Let V denote the set of all possible preference functions.
A preference profile u ∈V n is a n-tuple of preference functions (u1, . . . ,un). Also
for any preference profile u = (u1, . . . ,un) and any candidate j ∈M, we define u( j) =
∑
n
i=1 ui( j) for convenience.
A voting scheme or mechanism is a randomized function J : V n → M. That is,
a randomized function that generate a single winner from a preference profile. We
can also regard a voting scheme J as a function from V n to a distribution over M,
say, ∆(M). Moreover, for a mechanism J that already known to be deterministic,
we can simply regard J as a deterministic function from V n to M. Throughout this
paper we may use J under any one of the three different definitions above in the most
convenient way. Since the exact definition of J will be clear in the context, we don’t
need to worry about the ambiguity. Let Mech denote the set of all possible voting
schemes.
2.2 Classification of Voting Schemes
We say a voting scheme J ∈Mech to be truthful or strategy-proof if for any preference
profile u = (u1, . . . ,un) ∈ V
n, any voter i and any preference function u′i, we have
ui(J(ui,u−i)) ≥ ui(J(u
′
i,u−i)). Let Mech
T denote the set of all truthful mechanisms
in Mech.
For any two preference functions u,u′ ∈V , we say u and u′ are ordinal equivalent
(denoted by u∼ u′) if for any j0, j1 ∈M, u( j0)> u( j1) if and only if u
′( j0)> u
′( j1).
That is, whether we order the every candidate j ∈M by u( j) or by u′( j), the ordering
will be the same (and the ties will also be preserved moreover).
For any i ∈ N and two preference profile u,u′ ∈ V n where u = (u1, . . . ,un) and
u′ = (u′1, . . . ,u
′
n), we say u and u
′ i-ordinal equivalent (dented by u
i
∼ u′) if ui ∼ u
′
i
and u j = u
′
j for every j 6= i. We say u and u
′ ordinal equivalent (denoted by u ∼ u′)
if
∧m
i=1(ui ∼ u
′
i).
For a voting scheme J ∈Mech and any i∈N, we say J is i-ordinal if J(u) = J(u′)
for any u,u′ ∈ V n with u
i
∼ u′. For a voting scheme J ∈ Mech, we say J is ordinal
if J(u) = J(u′) for any u,u′ ∈ V n with u ∼ u′. Let Mechi-O denote the set of all i-
ordinal mechanisms in Mech for any i ∈ N. Similarly, let MechO be the set of all
ordinal mechanisms in Mech.
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We say a voting scheme J ∈ Mech is unilateral if there exists some i ∈ N such
that, J(ui,u−i) = J(ui,u
′
−i) for any ui ∈ V and u−i,u
′
−i ∈ V
n−1. Let Mech1 ⊆ Mech
denote the set of all unilateral mechanisms.
We say a voting scheme J ∈ Mech is duple if J ∈ MechO and there exists some
different i0, i1 ∈ N such that J(ui0 ,ui1 ,u
′
−i0,−i1
) = J(ui0 ,ui1 ,u
′
−i0,−i1
) for any ui0 ,ui1 ∈
V and u−i0,−i1 ,u
′
−i0,−i1
∈ V n−2. Let Mech2 ⊆ MechO denote the set of all unilateral
mechanisms.
We say a scheme J ∈ Mech is neutral if the scheme is fair to the candidates, i.e.,
the names of the candidates don’t matter. Formally, J is neutral if for any permutation
σ over M and any u = (u1, . . . ,un) ∈ V
n, we have σ(J(u)) = J(u1 ◦σ , . . . ,u1 ◦σ).
Let MechN be the set of all neutral mechanisms.
Similarly we say a scheme J ∈ Mech is anonymous if it is fair to the voters, i.e.,
the names of the voters don’t matter. Formally, J is anonymous if for any permutation
σ over N and any u = (u1, . . . ,un) ∈ V
n, we have J(u) = J(uσ(1), . . . ,uσ(n)). Let
MechA be the set of all anonymous mechanisms.
2.3 With and Without Ties
DefineU ⊆V be the set of preference functions without ties. Or more formally,U =
{u ∈V : u( j) 6= u( j′) for any j 6= j′}.
Therefore Un are the set of preference profiles without ties. Then we can de-
fine MechU to be the set of every voting scheme J which takes input in U
n. Hence
we can define MechTU,Mech
i-O
U ,Mech
O
U ,Mech
1
U,Mech
2
U,Mech
N
U,Mech
A
U ⊆ MechU
be the sets of truthful, i-ordinal, ordinal, unilateral, duple, neutral and anonymous
mechanisms in MechU in the obvious way.
Notice that for any J ∈ Mech, we can induce JU ∈ MechU from J naturally by
setting JU(u) = J(u) for any u ∈U
n. And then we have the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 If J ∈MechC, then JU ∈Mech
C
U, where C can be T, i-O,O,1,2,N,A.
Proof Just by plugging in that JU(u) = J(u) for every u ∈U
n and checking the defi-
nition of each MechCU, we can prove the correctness of the five lemmas above.
2.4 Some Mechanisms
Define RV ∈ Mech to be the range voting scheme. That is, the voting scheme such
that the winner RV(u) is always the candidate j∗ with maximized Wel( j∗,u)
For any q ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let J1,q ∈ MechT be the mechanism that choose a voter i
uniformly at random, and then choose a winner uniformly at random from voter i’s
q most favorited candidates. Here we break ties by the name of the candidates. That
is, if some voter i ∈ N equally like candidate j0, j1 ∈ M with j0 < j1, then we just
assume that voter i likes j0 better.
For any q ∈ {⌊n/2⌋+ 1, . . . ,n+ 1}, let J2,q ∈ MechT be the mechanism that
choose two different candidates uniformly at random, then let every voter vote for
on of the two candidate he likes better. If there exists one candidate gets at least q
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votes, let he/she be the winner. Otherwise flip a coin and pick a random winner from
the two candidates we chosen. Similarly we break ties by name of the candidate.
Let random-favorite mechanism be the nickname of J1,1.
Observe that even though J1,q’s and J2,q’s are not neutral, they’re no-tie versions
J
1,q
U ’s and J
2,q
U ’s are anonymous as well as neutral.
Define J∗ = 1
2
J1,1+ 1
2
J1,⌊m
1/3⌋ ∈ MechT. We will later show that J∗ is a mecha-
nism with ratio(J) = Ω(m−2/3).
2.5 Social Welfare
For any preference profile u = (u1, . . . ,un) ∈ V
n and any winner j ∈ M, define the
social welfare
Wel( j,u) =
n
∑
i=1
ui( j)
.
For any mechanism J ∈Mech and preference profile u ∈V n, define the ratio of J
on input u to be
ratio(J,u) =
E[Wel(J(u),u)]
Wel(RV (u),u)
For any mechanism J ∈ Mech, we define the ratio or the relative social welfare
of J to be
ratio(J) = inf
u∈Vn
ratio(J,u)
Similarly, for J ∈MechU, we can define
ratioU(J) = inf
u∈Un
E[Wel(J(u),u)]
Wel(RVU(u),u)
2.6 Negative Result for Ordinal Mechanisms without Ties
In this subsection I will show the proof of negative result for truthful ordinal mecha-
nism where ties are not allowed, stating that all such mechanisms can only achieve a
ratio of O(m−2/3). This original proof of this statement can be find in [5].
Theorem 1 [6] For any J ∈ MechOU ∩Mech
T
U, J is a convex combination of mecha-
nisms in Mech1U ∩Mech
O
U ∩Mech
T
U and mechanisms in Mech
2
U ∩Mech
T
U.
The proof of Theorem 1 is far too long to fit in a short paper like this. You can
find the proof in Allan Gibbard’s classical paper [6] published long long ago.
Theorem 2 [5] For any J ∈ MechAU ∩Mech
N
U ∩Mech
O
U ∩Mech
1
U ∩Mech
T
U, J is
a convex combination of some mechanisms J
1,q
U for q ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For any J ∈
MechAU ∩Mech
N
U ∩Mech
O
U ∩Mech
T
U such that J can be obtained by convex com-
binations of duple mechanisms, we have J is a convex combination of mechanisms
J
2,q
U for q ∈ {⌊n/2⌋+ 1, . . .,n+ 1}.
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A outline of proof of Theorem 2 can be found in paper [5], which is very similar
to a detailed proof to a closely related statement in two papers [7] and [8] written in
the 1970s. We won’t show the proof here either.
Corollary 1 [5] For any J ∈ MechOU ∩Mech
N
U ∩Mech
A
U ∩Mech
T
U, J is a convex
combination of J
1,q
U ’s for q ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and J
2,q
U ’s for q ∈ {⌊n/2⌋+ 1,n+ 1}.
Proof We can get the corollary directly by combining the Theorem 1 and Theorem
2.
Lemma 2 [5] For any J ∈ MechOU ∩Mech
T
U, there exists J
′ ∈ MechOU ∩Mech
N
U ∩
MechAU∩Mech
T
U such that ratioU(J
′)≤ ratioU(J).
Proof Consider any fixed J ∈MechOU ∩Mech
T
U. For any permutation σ over N and τ
overM, define Jσ ,τ by Jσ ,τ(u1, . . . ,un) = J(uσ(1) ◦τ, . . . ,uσ(n) ◦τ). By this definition,
for any u ∈Un, there exists u′ ∈Un such that J(u′) ≤ Jσ ,τ(u). Thus ratioU(Jσ ,τ) ≥
ratioU(J).
Now let J′ be the mechanism that choose a permutation σ over N and a per-
mutation τ over M uniformly at random. And then apply Jσ ,τ . More formally, J
′ =
1
n!m! ∑σ ,τ Jσ ,τ . Since ratioU(Jσ ,τ)≥ ratioU(J) for any σ and τ , and ratioU(J
′)≥ ratioU(J)
Now we are able to derive the negative result given in [5].
Theorem 3 [5] For a sufficient large m and a sufficiently larger n, for any mechanism
J ∈ MechOU ∩Mech
T
U we have ratioU(J) = O(m
−2/3).
My proof of this theorem is based on the proof given in [5]. But my proof is
simplified for the case that n is much larger than m. You can find a more general but
complex proof in [5].
Proof First by applying Lemma 2, it is sufficient to consider mechanism J inside
MechOU ∩Mech
T
U∩Mech
N
U∩Mech
A
U.
Let k = ⌊m1/3⌋ and g = ⌊m2/3⌋. Let n = m− 1+ g. Now we will try to construct
a single profile u ∈Un such that u makes ratio(J,u) be small for any J.
By applying Corollary 1, J can be seen as convex combinations of some J
1,q
U and
J
2,q
U . Then it is sufficient to show that ratio(J
1,q,u) and ratio(J2,q,u) is small enough
for all possible q.
Let M1, . . . ,Mg be a partition of {1, . . . ,kg}. We construct u = (u1, . . . ,un) as
follow:
Type (1) voters: For each i∈{1, . . . ,m−1}, let ui(i) = 1, ui(m)= 0 and let ui( j)<
1/m2 for all j /∈ {i,m}.
Type (2) voters: For each i ∈ {m, . . . ,m− 1+ g}, let ui( j) > 1− 1/m
2 if j ∈
Mi−m+1; let ui( j) = 1− 1/m
2 if j = m and let ui( j)< 1/m
2 otherwise.
Note that the best social welfare Wel(m,u) is (1− 1/m2)g while the other can-
didates are all < 2+ 1/m. Thus the conditional ratio when the winner is not m is
≤ (2+1/m)/(1−1/m2)g≤ 3m−2/3 = O(m−2/3). Now all we need is to find out the
probability that m is chosen as the winner.
For a mechanism J
2,q
U , m is chosen as the winner with probability at most 2/m.
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Now consider a mechanism J
1,q
U . If q ≤ k, m can never be the winner. Otherwise
m is the winner if and only if we pick a voter i with ui(m)> 0 and choose candidate
m as the final winner, which has probability
g
m− 1+ g
·
1
q
= O(m−1/3) ·O(m−1/3) = O(m−2/3)
Now we have proved the theorem with n = m− 1+ g. When n > m− 1+ g,
simply set u = (u1, . . . ,un) the same way as the case when n = m− 1+ g except we
let ui = ui−(m−1+g) when i>m−1+g. That is, when the number of voters are larger
than m− 1+ g, we just repeat the first m− 1+ g voters.
Since the fraction of Type (1) voters and Type (2) voters only varies within a
constant factor, we can use the same analysis method to analyze ratio(J,u). Similarly
expected ratio conditioned that m is not chosen is O(m−2/3) and the probability of
choosingm is also O(m−2/3). Then we have proved the theorem for all n≥m−1+g.
2.7 Classifications of Preference Functions
For any u ∈U , let I (u) denote the image of u.
For k ≥ m, define
Rk =
{
u ∈U : I (u)⊆
{
0,
1
k
, . . . ,
k− 1
k
,1
}}
For any u ∈ Rk, define
a(u) = #
{
j ∈ {0, . . . ,k− 1} :
[
j
k
∈I (u)
]
⊕
[
j+ 1
k
∈I (u)
]}
where ⊕ denotes exclusive-or. Note that a(u) must be even and a(u)≥ 2.
For k ≥ m, define
Ck = {u ∈ Rk : a(u) = 2}
For any u ∈Ck, define u¯ : N →{0,1} by
u¯( j) =
{
1 if u( j)> 0.5
0 if u( j)≤ 0.5
Also define
count(u) = |{ j ∈M : u¯( j) = 1}|
and rank(u, j) to be the rank of candidate j according to u for any j ∈M, i.e.,
rank(u, j) =
∣∣{ j′ ∈M : u( j′)≥ u( j)}∣∣
For any u = (u1, . . .un) ∈ (Ck)
n
g(u) =
E[∑ni=1 ui(J
∗(u))]
∑
n
i=1 ui(1)
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g¯(u) =
E[∑ni=1 u¯i(J
∗(u))]
∑
n
i=1 u¯i(1)
For all k ≥ m, define
D
(a)
k = {u ∈Ck : (count(u)≤ 2)∧ (u¯(1) = 1)}
D
(b)
k =
{
u ∈Ck : (count(u) = 1)∧ (rank(u,1)> ⌊m
1/3⌋)
}
D
(c)
k =
{
u ∈Ck : count(u) = rank(u,1) = ⌊m
1/3⌋+ 1
}
Dk = D
(a)
k ∪D
(b)
k ∪D
(c)
k
3 A Good Truthful Voting Scheme
In this section we will prove that for J∗ = 1
2
J1,1 + 1
2
J1,⌊m
1/3⌋ ∈ MechT, we have
ratio(J∗) = Ω(m−2/3).
Lemma 3
ratio(J∗) = liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Rk)n
ratio(J∗,u)
Proof We have
ratio(J∗) = inf
u∈V n
ratio(J∗,u)
Therefore it is sufficient to show that for any u = (u1, . . . ,un) there exists an array
of preference profiles
{u(k) = (u
(k)
1 , . . . ,u
(k)
n )}k≥10m10
such that every u(k) ∈ (Rk)
n and
ratio(J∗,u) = lim
k→∞
ratio(J∗,u(k))
We try to construct each u
(k)
i as follow:
(1) For any j0, j1 ∈M, let u
(k)
i ( j0)< u
(k)
i ( j1) if and only if
[ui( j0)< ui( j1)]∨ ([ui( j0) = ui( j1)]∧ [ j0 < j1])
(2) Minimize
m
∑
j=1
|u
(k)
i ( j)− ui( j)|
Obviously limk→∞ u
(k)
i = ui.
Note that J∗ = 0.5J1,1+ 0.5J1,⌊m
1/3⌋ where both J1,1 and J1,⌊m
1/3⌋ break ties by
numbering of candidates, which is exactly the same way we decide the ordering
of candidates in u
(k)
i . Therefore we have J
∗(u(k)) = J∗(u) for any k ≥ 10m10. Thus
f (x) = ratio(J∗,x) can be seen as a continuous function for all possible profile x =
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(x1, ...,xn) ∈U
n such that for any j0, j1 ∈M, xi( j0) < xi( j1) if and only if [ui( j0) <
ui( j1)]∨ ([ui( j0) = ui( j1)]∧ [ j0 < j1]).
Therefore by the property of continuous function we have
ratio(J∗,u) = lim
k→∞
ratio(J∗,u(k))
Lemma 4
liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Rk)
n
ratio(J∗,u) = liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Rk)
n
g(u)
Proof The lemma can be written as
liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Rk)
n
E[∑ni=1 ui(J
∗(u))]
∑
n
i=1 ui(RV(u))
= liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Rk)
n
E[∑ni=1 ui(J
∗(u))]
∑
n
i=1ui(1)
(Rk)
n ⊆Un. Futhermore, J∗U is neutral, i.e., when no tie is allowed in preference
profile J∗ is neutral. Therefore if we constrain u ∈ (Rk)
n,
E[∑ni=1 ui(J
∗(u))]
∑
n
i=1 ui(RV(u))
can be mini-
mized when RV (u) = 1.
Lemma 5 [5]
liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Rk)
n
g(u) = liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Ck)
n
g(u)
Proof We prove this lemma by induction on ∑
n
i=1 a(ui) where u = (u1, . . . ,un). If
∑
n
i=1 a(ui)= 2n, u∈ (Ck)
n. Otherwise we can find a i∈N such that a(ui)> 2. Thenwe
can find a interval 0 < j0 ≤ j1 < k such that { j0/k, . . . , j1/k} ⊆I (ui), ( j0− 1)/k /∈
I (ui) and ( j1 + 1)/k /∈ I (ui). Then we can try to “move” the the interval left or
right. Either moving it left or right can make both g(u) and a(ui) smaller. Thus by
induction we can prove the lemma.
A more detailed proof can be found in Page 8 of [5].
Lemma 6
liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Ck)
n
g(u) = liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Dk)
n
g(u)
Proof From now on we set k→+∞.
For any profile u = (u1, . . . ,un) ∈ (Ck)
n \ (Dk)
n, there exists i ∈ N such that ui ∈
Ck \Dk. If we can prove that there exists a vi ∈ Dk such that g(vi,u−i) ≤ g(ui,u−i),
the lemma is proved. Since when k→ ∞, u( j) = u¯( j) for any u ∈Ck, it is sufficient
to show that there exists vi ∈ Dk such that g¯(vi,u−i)≤ g¯(ui,u−i).
Since g¯(u) =
E[∑ni=1 u¯i(J
∗(u))]
∑
n
i=1 u¯i(1)
, to show g(vi,u−i)≤ g(ui,u−i), it is sufficient to show
that there exists a vi ∈ Dk such that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) J∗(vi,u−i) = J
∗(ui,u−i);
(2) v¯i(1)≥ u¯i(1);
(3) v¯i( j) ≤ u¯i( j) for any j 6= 1.
Also, notice that the mechanism J∗ can also be viewed as picking a random voter
i, and then flip a coin. If it is a Head, choose voter i’s favorite candidate, otherwise
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choose a candidate among voter i’s ⌊m1/3⌋ most favorite candidates uniformly at
random. Then the condition (1) can be rewrite as
S(ui) = S(vi)
where for any u ∈Ck,
S(u) =
(
{ j ∈M : r(u, j) = 1},{ j ∈M : 1< r(u, j)≤ ⌊m1/3⌋}
)
.
To prove this, we will do some discussion on the properties of ui.
Case 1, rank(ui,1)≤ ⌊m
1/3⌋:
Case 1.1, rank(ui,1) = 1 : Let vi be the preference function that v¯i( j) = 0 for
every j 6= 1 and rank(vi, j) = rank(ui, j). Then vi ∈ D
(a)
k and all the three conditions
are satisfied.
Case 1.2, rank(ui,1) > 1 : Let j
′ be the candidate with rank(ui, j
′) = 1. Then
let vi be the preference function such that S(vi) = S(ui) and v¯i( j) = 1 if and only if
j ∈ {1, j′}. Then vi ∈D
(a)
k and all the three conditions are satisfied.
Case 2, rank(ui,1)> ⌊m
1/3⌋:
Case 2.1, u¯i(1) = 1 : We have for any j with rank(ui, j) ≤ ⌊m
1/3⌋, u¯i( j) = 1.
Thereforewe can let vi be the preference function such that S(vi)= S(ui), rank(vi,1)=
⌊m1/3⌋+ 1 and v¯i( j) = 1 if and only if j = 1 or rank(ui, j) ≤ ⌊m
1/3⌋. Then vi ∈ D
(c)
k
and all the three conditions are satisfied.
Case 2.2, u¯i(1) = 0 : Let j
′ be the candidate with rank(ui, j
′) = 1. Then let vi be
the preference function such that S(vi) = S(ui) and v¯i( j) = 1 if and only if j = j
′.
Then vi ∈ D
(b)
k and all the three conditions are satisfied.
This is the end of the proof.
Corollary 2
ratio(J) = liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Dk)
n
g(u)
Proof The corollary comes from combining Lemma 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Theorem 4 ratio(J∗) = Ω(m−2/3) as n≥ m and m→ ∞
Proof Follow Corollary 2, we have
ratio(J∗) = liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Dk)n
g(u) = liminf
k→∞
min
u∈(Dk)n
g¯(u)
From now on consider a profile u ∈ (Dk)
n.
By anonymity of J∗, without loss of generality, we can assume that the first a
voters have valuation functions in D
(a)
k , the following b voters’ are in D
(b)
k and the
remaining c voters’ are in D
(c)
k .
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Also, let random variable T be the chosen voter. Let random variableW be the
winning candidate. Let F be the event that we use the random-favorite mechanism,
i.e., J1,1. Let X =
∑
n
i=1 u¯i(W )
∑
n
i=1 u¯i(1)
. Then we can bound
g¯(u) = E[X ]
≥ Pr[(T ≤ a)∧ (¬F)∧ (W = 1)]
+Pr[(T ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b})∧F]E[X |(T ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b})∧F]
+Pr[(T ∈ {a+ b+ 1, . . .,n})∧¬F]E[X |(T ∈ {a+ b+ 1, . . .,n})∧¬F]
We have
Pr[(T ≤ a)∧ (¬F)∧ (W = 1)] =
1
2
·
a
n
·
1
⌊m1/3⌋
=
a
2n⌊m1/3⌋
.
We also have
Pr[(T ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b})∧F]E[X |(T ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b})∧F] (1)
=
1
2
·
b
n
E[X |(T ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b})∧F] (2)
=
1
2
·
b
n
·
1
b
a+b
∑
i=a+1
E[X |(T = i)∧F] (3)
=
1
2
·
b
n
·
1
b
a+b
∑
i=a+1
∑
n
j=1∑w:u¯i(w)=1 u¯ j(w)
a+ c
(4)
≥
1
2
·
b
n
·
1
b
a+b
∑
i=a+1
∑
a+b
j=a+1∑w:u¯i(w)=1 u¯ j(w)
a+ c
(5)
=
1
2
·
b
n
·
1
b
·
1
a+ c
m−1
∑
w=1
|{i ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b} : u¯i(w) = 1}|
2 (6)
≥
1
2
·
b
n
·
1
b
·
1
a+ c
(m− 1)
(
b
m− 1
)2
(7)
=
b2
2n(m− 1)(a+ c)
(8)
where (4) comes from the fact that when T = i ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b} and we use J1,1
mechanism, the winner is always the only w with u¯i(w) = 1; equality (6) comes from
recounting the terms; inequality (7) comes from the generalized mean inequality and
the fact that
m−1
∑
w=1
|{i ∈ {a+ 1, . . . ,a+ b} : u¯i(w) = 1}|= b
.
Similarly we have
Pr[(V ∈ {a+ b+ 1, . . .,n})∧¬F]E[X |(V ∈ {a+ b+ 1, . . .,n})∧¬F]
≥
c2m1/3
2n(m− 1)(a+ c)
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Therefore we have
g¯(u)≥
a
2nm1/3
+
b2
2n(m− 1)(a+ c)
+
c2m1/3
2n(m− 1)(a+ c)
Now we just consider the case that n≥ m and m→+∞. Then we have
g¯(u) = Ω
(
a
nm1/3
+
b2
nm(a+ c)
+
c2m1/3
nm(a+ c)
)
Since n = a+ b+ c, either a = Ω(n), b = Ω(n) or c = Ω(n). If a = Ω(n), we
have g¯(u)≥ a
nm1/3
= Ω(m−1/3) and we finish the prove. If c= Ω(n), we have g¯(u)≥
c2m1/3
nm(a+c) = Ω(m
−2/3) and we finish. Then from now on we can assume that b= Ω(n)
and a,c= o(n). Then we have
g¯(u) = Ω
(
a
nm1/3
+
n
m(a+ c)
+
c2m1/3
nm(a+ c)
)
If a= Ω(a+ c), we have
g¯(u) = Ω
( a
nm1/3
+
n
ma
)
= Ω
(
a
nm1/3
+
m−4/3
a
nm1/3
)
= Ω(m−2/3)
, which satisfies the theorem.
Now we can assume c= Ω(a+ c), and we have
g¯(u) = Ω
( n
mc
+
c
nm−2/3
)
= Ω
( n
mc
+
mc
n
m−4/3
)
= Ω(m−2/3)
This is the end of the proof.
4 Discussion of the Preference Assumption
In the beginning of the paper we make the preference assumption requiring that every
preference function u must be a function fromM to [0,1] such that there exists some
j0 and j1 inM with ui( j0) = 0 and ui( j1) = 1.
We know that this assumption is reasonable and sufficient to make the definition
of relative social welfare well defined. However, in this section we will show that this
assumption is necessary to make the problem interesting enough to study.
Now assume that a preference function can be any function fromM to [0,1]. Note
that Lemma ?? still holds.
Let n= m and we can construct profiles u(k) = (u1, . . . ,un) as follow:
(1) For any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ui(i)> ui(i+ 1)> · · ·> ui(n)> ui(1)> ui(2)> · · ·>
ui(i− 1).
(2) uk(k) = 1 and ui( j)< ε for some extremely small ε all (i, j) 6= (k,k).
For any truthful mechanism J, we know that it is ordinal by Lemma ??. Then
no matter what k is, the distribution of J(u(k)) remain unchanged. Then there exists
some i∗ ∈M such that Pr[J(u(k)) = i∗]≤ 1/m.
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Now we have
ratio(J)≤ ratio(J,u(i
∗))≈ 1/m
which not better than the trivial scheme that choose a random winner.
Thus if we don’t add the preference assumption, the problem will become boring,
which shows that the preference assumption is necessary.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we showed a model of cardinal voting which is proved to be reasonable,
universal and as general as possible. Under such model, the paper provide a positive
result providing a truthful mechanism with a relative social welfare of Ω(m−2/3),
which is asymptotically tight.
In conclusion, this paper solves all the problems about relative social welfare of
a truthful voting scheme with cardinal preference in asymptotic sense.
Acknowledgements Thank Andrew Chi-Chih Yao for the discussion about the problem.
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